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GREAT BRITAIN GAMBLES WITH THE ROYAL NAVY
Geoffrey Till
The news late last year that the Type 23 frigate HMS Northumberland was tobe replaced on the Falklands patrol by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary Largs Bay in
order to join the international counterpiracy effort in the Gulf of Aden raised
quite a few eyebrows. This was not because anyone seriously thought that Ar-
gentina would seek to profit from the absence of a British warship in these con-
tested waters for the first time since 1982 but more as it seemed to show just how
bad things were getting for the once-mighty Royal Navy that its first-line fleet
could not apparently cover both commitments at once.1 Worse still had been the
sad story of the ambush by the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard Corps of a boarding party from HMS Cornwall
in 2007, described by the then First Sea Lord, Admiral
Sir Jonathon Band, as “one bad day in our proud
400-year history.” Subsequent investigations showed
that there had simply not been time or resources for
the boarding party to be sufficiently trained in the re-
quirements of operating in that particularly difficult
situation. Such events led to a spate of articles that the
Royal Navy was in serious trouble, “on the brink,”
heading into stormy waters, or had even “strangely
died.”2
To many observers, these incidents seemed to illus-
trate a chronic and worsening problem—the drastic
decline in the numbers of warships available to the
Royal Navy, compared to its inexorably rising number
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of commitments.3 The Royal Navy now comprises just 101 units, including six-
teen inshore patrol boats used only to train university cadets. Every year the
Royal Navy seems to have had one hull less on the water. In 1980 there were
sixty-seven frigates and destroyers; by 2020 the figure could be as low as eigh-
teen. Even in the past ten years, destroyer and frigate numbers have shrunk from
thirty-five to twenty-three, despite the recommendations of the 1998 Strategic
Defence Review. Six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) have been de-
commissioned in the same period. But at the same time, among the effective
ships remaining in “extended or reduced readiness” (or more cynically, “in
mothballs”) in Portsmouth were the carrier Invincible, three air-defense de-
stroyers (Exeter, Nottingham, and Southampton, nearly two years before their
time), two offshore patrol ships, and four Royal Fleet Auxiliary logistic ships. At
least two Type 42 guided-missile destroyers have gone on operations with their
Sea Dart air-defense missiles disabled. In recent times other modern vessels have
been disposed of prematurely: the Upholder SSKs (conventionally powered
hunter-killer submarines) to Canada (which meant the abandonment of the
Royal Navy’s conventional submarine capability), three of the first generation of
Type 23 frigates to Chile, and others. And so it seems to go on. . . .
Questions naturally arise, not least for Americans concerned at the possible
fate of one of their leading naval allies, especially given their own budgetary
problems at a time of considerable commitment around the world and the rela-
tive rise of the maritime powers of the Asia-Pacific. Is this just a part of a dra-
matic shift of naval power from West to East? If so, to what extent? How bad are
things generally—and how much worse are they likely to get? What will it mean
for the U.S. Navy?
Trying to answer these questions requires us to look at what the British seem
to think their Royal Navy is for and then to gauge the gap between its commit-
ments and its current and future resources. We will find that the gap is wide and
probably unsustainable. We will review and reassess all aspects of British de-
fense, the Royal Navy’s commitments, and its most important programs (Tri-
dent replacement, the Astute SSNs, Type 45 destroyers, carriers, afloat
sustainability, and plans for future surface combatants). Given the bleak state of
Britain’s public finances, the point that emerges is that the Royal Navy is cur-
rently engaged in the hardest part of one of the longest and most challenging
campaigns in its illustrious history, the outcome of which is at the moment too
close to call. The Royal Navy may emerge from this, one of its greatest battles, as a
totally transformed and still globally significant navy, ready to “fight and win” in
the conditions of the twenty-first century. Certainly, if it doesn’t, the world will
be a different place, not least for the United States.
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SO, WHAT IS THE ROYAL NAVY FOR?
The apparent decline of the Royal Navy seems strange, since the British have al-
ways been regarded as a particularly maritime nation, with a long-standing in-
terest in the defense of the maritime trading system upon which the prosperity
and security of the country has always been seen to depend. “The UK is,” admits
the country’s new National Security Strategy, “and ever has been, a distinctively
maritime nation.”4 According to the A. T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalization
Index, the United Kingdom is the twelfth-most-engaged country in the world
economy. If one excludes the factors that disproportionately skew the calcula-
tions toward countries with very small populations, the United Kingdom rises to
third position, behind only the United States and Canada.5
Defending trade and market access has accordingly long been a major role for
the Royal Navy. In the language of its own traditional prayer, the Royal Navy itself
has acted as “a security for such as pass on the seas upon their lawful occasions.”
For all his fame in winning decisive battles, even Admiral Horatio Nelson accepted
that the fundamental justification for the Royal Navy was to defend trade. “I con-
sider,” he told one of his captains, “the protection of our trade the most essential
service that can be performed.”6 And yet, despite all these centuries of tradition,
the ancient emphasis on the direct defense of trade at sea has over the years been
quietly airbrushed out of the list of the country’s main military tasks.7 This is
largely the product of a risk-management decision-making system at the Ministry
of Defence (MOD) in which maritime affairs in general and the Royal Navy in
particular seem to command much less attention than they did.
There is a curious disconnect here between objective reality and the decision
maker’s perception of it. The apparent relegation of maritime affairs is not due
to any actual decline in Britain’s sea-dependence—far from it, in fact. The
United Kingdom remains a preeminent trading nation. By volume, 92 percent of
British trade is conducted by sea. So used are the British to laments about their
declining financial and maritime status that the rapid growth of their shipping
industry is hardly noticed. After a twenty-year decline in British shipping, a
government-inspired major reformulation of regulations and taxation arrange-
ments have led to a merchant fleet now 170 percent larger than it was in 2000.
The shipping industry employs forty thousand people in the United Kingdom
directly, as well as another 212,000 indirectly, and brings £4.7 billion to the
country every year.8 This sea dependence is, moreover, beginning to percolate
into public consciousness more than it used to. When the MV Napoli grounded
off the Devon coast in January 2007, thousands of tons of valuable imported
goods washed up onto the beaches—and with them came a sudden, belated, and
unexpected recognition of just how dependent every aspect of British life is on
the safe and timely arrival and departure of merchant shipping.
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Nowhere is this more true than in the field of energy security. The United
Kingdom is already a net importer of natural gas and will soon become a net im-
porter of oil. Lamentably low stocks ashore mean that were there to be any sig-
nificant interruption of this trade, it would not be long before Britain’s lights
would go out. The National Security Strategy recognizes the fact that the United
Kingdom’s energy security needs to be seen against a global background in
which, before the recession hit, world energy consumption was increasing at a
rate of 2.6 percent per year, twice as fast as in the previous decade. “Supplies,” it
says, “may not be able to keep up, intensifying competition for energy and lead-
ing to instability and conflict.”9 From every angle, then, the worldwide market
shapes Britain’s energy interests. Whether it likes it or not, in this as in so many
other ways, the United Kingdom is enmeshed in the consequences of globaliza-
tion. It sees itself as a constituent in a supranational economic system that oper-
ates above and beyond the traditional purview of the nation-state. Because this
can become a source of vulnerability, the United Kingdom has a “particularly
large stake in the success of the international rules-based system.”10
Globalization, of course, is the product of a system that depends absolutely
on seaborne trade, and as Albert Thayer Mahan reminded us over a century ago,
it is vulnerable and faces a range of threats: “This, with the vast increase in rapid-
ity of communication, has multiplied and strengthened the bonds knitting the
interests of nations to one another, till the whole now forms an articulated sys-
tem not only of prodigious size and activity, but of excessive sensitiveness, un-
equaled in former ages.”11
The threats and challenges that the system faces are wide and varied. They in-
clude the prospect of conflict between various types of sea users (disputed juris-
dictions, fishermen against the oil industry, etc.), all forms of maritime crime,
the depletion of sea-based resources, and environmental deterioration. Some-
times trade can suffer, as it did in the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, from inadver-
tent involvement in the quarrels of others. The global trading system indeed
could be destroyed by large-scale interstate warfare, as it nearly was before and
after the First World War.12 These days the system can be the subject of exploita-
tion or even direct and premeditated attack from groups or states hostile to its
intentions or its effects. Finally, the system can be at risk to a global pandemic or
a financial meltdown in response to what Karl Marx called capitalism’s “internal
contradictions.”
Any of these threats can disrupt trade and, importantly, the conditions for trade.
Because the United Kingdom is part of the sea-based trading system, its economic
security will be affected too, directly or indirectly. This is not a matter of choice for
the United Kingdom, but whether it chooses to play its part in the defense of the sys-
tem and how it chooses to do so most certainly are. Accordingly, there is a general
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consensus that “preserving the trading environment should be recognised and pri-
oritised as a fully justifiable military task for the new millennium.”13
The British choice has been to be a full participant, not merely a bystander, in
the world’s events. The latter approach is explicitly rejected: “Our approach to
the global era is an internationalist one, and we are committed to working with
partners to develop and adapt the rules based international system to meet the
demands of the twenty first century.”14
. . . AND FROM THIS DEVELOPS THE ROYAL NAVY’S TASKS
The recognized role of the United Kingdom’s armed forces in general, and of the
Royal Navy in particular, flows from all this. “Preserving the trading environ-
ment” calls for the Navy to defend trade and, less obviously, the conditions for
trade, both directly by what it does at sea and indirectly by what it does from it.
This is generally seen to require the development of four different sets of
capability:
• Fighting and winning wars
• Staging distant expeditions
• Defending good order at sea
• Preventing and deterring conflict.
Fighting and Winning Wars
Fighting and winning wars remain a high priority even in the age of globaliza-
tion. Globalization might fail—it has before. Today’s variant has systemic weak-
nesses, as is all too obvious, and faces potentially well-equipped adversaries. It
will be under a particular strain in the 2030s, when some predict a “perfect
storm” resulting from a coincidence of global warming, possible pandemics, and
gross shortages in oil, food, and water. National competitiveness, already evident
in the consequences of recession, is likely to increase.15 While according to the
National Security Strategy there is no such serious threat today, it is not possible
to rule out the reemergence of a major state-led threat to the United Kingdom,
its dependencies, or its allies over the longer term.16
But even if globalization doesn’t fail so catastrophically, the capacity to fight
and win wars remains vital, because, after all, serious interstate conflict not in-
volving the United Kingdom directly still poses a critical level of threat to the
system as a whole. The Royal Navy continues to make the case that maintaining
the capacity to fight and win is still the most effective deterrent to war in an un-
certain future.17 Moreover, the Navy’s argument runs, the standards associated
with the capacity to engage in high-intensity conflict usually offer high levels
of precision, effect, and (very important from the political point of view)
T I L L 3 7
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protection for the British forces engaged with lower-intensity, asymmetric
opponents.
For all these reasons, the Royal Navy takes the retention of its world-class ca-
pabilities in such high-end disciplines as antisubmarine and antiair warfare
(ASW and AAW) as critical to its present and future strategic effectiveness.
Hence the appearance of the Daring Type 45 destroyer, the Astute class of sub-
marine, and the Navy’s long insistence on a recapitalization of its existing air-
craft carrier fleet. For all that, there is a concern that the Royal Navy has not been
able to pay as much attention as it would wish to some of these disciplines, be-
cause of the passing distractions of Afghanistan.
Although much of the popular debate still tends to focus on traditional plat-
forms, the British recognize that future effectiveness, precision, and maneuver-
ability may depend in large measure on a network-centric approach, unmanned
vehicles, robotics, loitering systems, precision systems, engineering, signature
reduction, the consequence of increasing ranges of weapons and sensors, and so
forth. Part of its case for the hugely sophisticated and so far highly successful
Daring-class destroyers is the aspiration to stay up with the hunt in technologi-
cal innovation, even to lead it in some areas, expensive though this might be. If
the Royal Navy is to continue as a significant naval player, the argument goes, it
really has little choice about this, given the rising capacity of adversaries to chal-
lenge even complex networks, sensors, and weapons.
Staging Distant Expeditions
Here is the obvious response to the impulse to “go to a distant crisis before it
comes to you” in order to defend the system by liberal intervention ashore.18 This
capability focuses more on the protection of the conditions for trade ashore than
on the trade at sea itself. This traditional focus in British strategy is unlikely to
change. “We remain committed,” says the National Security Strategy, “to retain-
ing robust, expeditionary and flexible armed forces for the foreseeable future.”19
The 1998 Strategic Defence Review pointed out that “maritime forces are in-
herently well suited to most force projection operations. Their reach, ability to
sustain themselves without reliance on host nation support and flexibility are
invaluable attributes. A joint maritime force often provides the opportunity for
early and timely intervention in potential crises.”20 The Royal Navy, indeed,
demonstrated the advantages of maritime power projection of this sort in the
first and second Iraq wars, the opening Afghanistan campaign, and the now al-
most forgotten but highly successful Sierra Leone operation of 2000.21
British maritime power projection, usually but not always in consort with
others, has taken a variety of forms, from the capacity to conduct, or threaten,
amphibious assaults to the delivery of ordnance from the sea, at one end of the
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spectrum, to the conduct of humanitarian relief operations, at the other. It all
depends, however, on the kind of assured access to be expected from the capacity
to fight and win wars discussed earlier.
Depending very much on the scenario and particularly the level of opposi-
tion to be expected, mounting “expeditions” of this wide-ranging sort may call
for the capacity to sustain, transport, and support civilian populations or landed
forces or both; to engage in amphibious operations; to develop specialist forces
for riverine and lacustrine pre- and postconflict stabilization operations; and, if
necessary, to strike adversaries ashore with sea-launched missiles and naval gun-
nery. Hence the British focus on Carrier Strike and Littoral Manoeuvre task
groups to secure sea control and project power ashore.
In recent years, and in conformity with the 1997 Strategic Defence Review,
the Royal Navy’s amphibious capabilities have been completely transformed and
revitalized with two new 14,600-ton assault ships (HM Ships Albion and Bul-
wark), the helicopter carrier HMS Ocean (twenty-one thousand tons), and four
new sixteen-thousand-ton Bay-class landing ships, supported by six Ro-Ro fer-
ries for strategic sealift. But even with recent enhancements a Littoral Ma-
noeuvre Group cannot provide the personnel, vehicles, and stores required for a
full maneuver brigade. At the same time, the Royal Navy’s Carrier Strike Task
Group depends on the invaluable Invincible-class carriers, now only with
ground-attack Harriers—these are clearly at the end of their operational careers.
With the contentious early retirement of Sea Harrier FA.2 fleet in March 2006
and having no deployed air-defense fighter at sea, the Royal Navy is in the midst
of an embarrassing “capability holiday” until the Joint Strike Fighter (or JSF, the
F-35) arrives.22 Nonetheless, the Royal Navy’s recent development of capabilities
for what it calls “littoral manoeuvre” and its ambitious carrier replacement pro-
gram are predicated on the assumption that an uncertain future demands the
development of a much enhanced capability for sea-based force projection.
The perceived cost and debatable effects of the Iraq and Afghanistan opera-
tions have sparked a certain wariness in some quarters about a continuation of
the United Kingdom’s expeditionary impulse.23 Despite this, it seems highly un-
likely that Britain will turn away from its long-term policy of supporting mili-
tary interventions in support of a rules-based international system—even in
some circumstances without the specific approval of the Security Council, but
only once all other options have been exhausted.24 The Iraq and Afghanistan ex-
periences are, however, likely to reduce greatly a future British government’s ap-
petite for large-scale and open-ended interventions of this sort while increasing
its longer-term interest in the more limited liabilities (and, admittedly, aspira-
tions) of distinctively maritime conceptions of expeditionary operations.25
T I L L 3 9
7
Till: Great Britain Gambles with the Royal Navy
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
Here, sea-based expeditionary forces obviously come into their own, with
their capacity to project power in their own right—to insert, support, and ex-
tract landed forces into and from areas of concern, which are mostly near
water.26 Hence the increased political salience of the Royal Navy’s interest in all
types of expeditionary activity, including sea basing, the capacity to operate
sustainably at sea with a much reduced physical and political footprint ashore.
The Royal Navy is not slow in making such points.
As part of its determination to foster the mentality of deployability, the Royal
Navy has for decades staged regular group deployments around the world, even
when its equipment and maintenance state and the government’s political will
to engage “out of area” were low—as was the case in the 1970s after the decision
to withdraw “from East of Suez.” Despite that injunction the Royal Navy contin-
ued to foster its global presence, and with all its difficulties, commitments, and
operational stretch, it continues to do so.27 The previous First Sea Lord made the
point that “only by genuinely deploying ships on operational tasks will they play
to their inherent strengths of poise, presence and inbuilt sustainability. Navies
are for using—they are not just insurance policies.”28
The Royal Navy has, for example, just completed Operation TAURUS, an am-
bitious group deployment of one of its amphibious task groups. At its peak it
was led by Bulwark and Ocean and was accompanied by two Type 23 frigates,
HM Ships Argyll and Somerset; a French frigate, FS Dupleix; an Arleigh
Burke–class destroyer, the USS Mitscher; a Trafalgar-class SSN, HMS Talent; two
Bay-class landing ships; three Royal Fleet Auxiliaries; and the survey ship HMS
Echo. The force conducted amphibious operations in Turkey and the Gulf and
riverine operations in Bangladesh and Brunei, and it interacted with seventeen
other navies around the world. The force included both Royal Marines and
Royal Air Force (RAF) units, nicely illustrating what the Royal Navy considers to
be the strategic versatility of a properly constituted and all-round joint and
combined maritime force.
Defending Good Order at Sea
The defense of good order at sea—or to give it its more contemporary label,
maritime security, as against terrorists, criminals, and the careless—is an imme-
diate precondition for the effective operation of the global trading system.
Moreover, as an island nation heavily dependent on seaborne trade, Britain is
more economically dependent on good maritime order than are many other
states.29 But good order at sea is also critical for wider concepts of national secu-
rity. About thirty tons of heroin, for example, enter Britain every year (mainly
from Afghanistan), together with vast quantities of cocaine from South Amer-
ica; this clearly represents a threat to the peace and prosperity of every British
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citizen. Intercepting the passage of illegal drugs at sea—and of illegal immi-
grants too, for that matter—therefore constitutes a significant contribution to
individual human security in the United Kingdom. The Royal Navy has been ac-
tive for years in the rarely publicized campaign to intercept and disrupt the drug
trade in the Caribbean and across the Atlantic to Europe.30 The current empha-
sis on the threat to the homeland posed by al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates has further
reinforced the importance of maritime security operations.
Some argue that if handled sensitively, this growth of interest could be good
for the Navy—at least, if the fortunes of the navy next door in Ireland are any-
thing to go by. The Irish navy has risen from two to eleven platforms in fifteen
years, solely on the basis of its task of maintaining good order in the country’s
territorial sea and exclusive economic zone. Perhaps the Royal Navy might bene-
fit in like manner? The difficulty is that forces designed for the preservation of
good order in home waters are unlikely to have the sailing and fighting charac-
teristics required for the first two tasks just discussed and so, given the Royal
Navy’s overall proclivities, are bound to take a second place in that service, if one
of increasing importance.
This inclination is further reinforced by the United Kingdom’s general accep-
tance of the fact that the globalization of such maritime threats means that the
first line of defense of Britain’s home waters has to be much farther forward.
“The distinctive characteristics of the UK as a nation mean that it is impossible,
when thinking about our own national security interests, to separate the ‘do-
mestic’ and the ‘international.’” For this reason, the National Security Strategy
concludes, there is an important “away game” aspect to the enforcement of good
order at sea.31 “This implies a strong case for investing in certain kinds of naval
forces, such as frigates, capable of playing a role in both interdiction at sea and
maintenance of maritime law and order.”32
The task calls for collective and cooperative maritime domain awareness
across the world ocean, not just at home. This mandates close habits of coopera-
tion with other navies, coast guards, and maritime security agencies. It demands
sophisticated, flexible, and adaptable legal regimes to deal with pirates, drug
smugglers, and human traffickers operating across possibly ambiguous national
jurisdictions. Through ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition,
and Reconnaissance), it requires an emphasis on thoroughly integrated surveil-
lance to track down mobile and covert adversaries, as well as a structured and
balanced sufficiency of cheaper frigates, corvettes, ocean and offshore patrol
vessels, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and even submarines on
occasion, to intercept wrongdoers and enforce jurisdiction. Given the vastness
of the oceans and the ranges of tasks and of possible adversaries, numbers have a
quality all of their own in the preservation of good order at sea.
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Preventing and Deterring Conflict
Prevention and deterrence may well head off incipient problems before they be-
come crises for the system. Here the main naval contribution to national and
global security could well lie in what does not happen. Maritime power is as
much about preventing conflict as about winning it. The Royal Navy’s role in
helping guard Iraq’s two critical oil platforms against attacks by insurgents and
its successful training program to prepare the Iraqi navy and marines to assume
that responsibility themselves illustrate deterrence and prevention, respectively.
Together they reduce the future need for external countries to concern them-
selves with Iraqi and Gulf security.
The prevention of conflict is seen to depend in large measure on the benign
presence of naval forces able to develop sustainable relationships with local
states; to help states build up their capacity to defend themselves against such
major problems as climate change, humanitarian disaster, poor governance, and
the like; and, if necessary, to reassure them against prospective adversaries. Pre-
vention may also call for constructive capacity-building engagement, especially
in the good-order tasks discussed earlier, since, as the piracy problem in the Gulf
of Aden shows, a lack of good governance in one area may result in security
threats that challenge the system.
The piracy situation off Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden illustrates the conse-
quence of a failure of governance at sea. The Royal Navy is taking a leading role
in this long campaign to address the consequences of this; it established and led
the European Union (EU) Operation ATALANTA and until recently provided the
flagship for the Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 in the Gulf of Aden.33 The
United Kingdom was also instrumental behind the scenes in setting up the legal
arrangements with Kenya that allowed the authorities there to prosecute cap-
tured pirates on behalf of the international community. Better by far, however,
would it have been for naval forces to have contributed proactively to Somalia’s
capacity to defend and exploit sustainably its own marine resources, thereby
preventing the situation from arising in the first place. “Stabilization,” the argu-
ment goes, should be about preventing conflict rather than restoring the situa-
tion afterward.
Ensuring good order at sea calls for the development of jurisdictional and en-
forcement capabilities in the countries of relevant regions, since disorder at sea
often follows deficiencies of this sort. Although sometimes constrained rather
than encouraged by the Ministry of Defence, the Royal Navy therefore takes ca-
pacity building very seriously and has demonstrated an impressive ability to get
things done. The successful cruise and capacity-building port calls of HMS En-
durance (far removed from its normal role in the South Atlantic) around the
coast of Africa last year was, like the U.S. African Partnership Station, which it
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partly inspired, intended to reduce the prospects of the Somalia situation recur-
ring elsewhere in the continent.34
And where there is an adversary to be deterred, early demonstrations of force
can nip the problem in the bud. Potential wrongdoers ashore and afloat are
identified and deterred by the presence of naval forces clearly able to limit their
chances of success. What constitutes a successful deterrent will depend in large
measure on the nature of the prospective adversary, but in most cases short of
interstate war it resides in a regular naval presence in areas of concern of vessels
appropriate for the tasks in hand. Frigates and ocean-capable patrol vessels for
visible presence and submarines for covert surveillance are most commonly
used for this purpose, and they are most effective when acting closely in consort
with the vessels of other like-minded nations.
Finally, of course, there is deterrence at the top, nuclear end of the spectrum.
For all its interest in limiting or even reversing nuclear proliferation, the current
British government remains set on the country’s maintaining the independent
nuclear deterrent now exclusively provided by the Royal Navy’s four Vanguard
submarines.35 With this continuous aspiration, of course, comes a requirement
for the sustainment of certain specialist types of defense industrial expertise and
operational skills, such as deepwater ASW.
SO, GIVEN THE NEED FOR THESE TASKS, WHAT’S THE PROBLEM?
Even in today’s contentious and difficult times, relatively few people involved in
or merely observing the British defense debate would seriously dispute very
much of this, but for all that there remain the serious problems of paying for it
all and deciding priorities—that is, the problem is a resources-commitments
gap.
For much of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the biggest prob-
lem confronting Britain’s naval planners has been a sometimes acute shortage of
resources and a seemingly ever-widening gap between these and a level of com-
mitment significantly higher than originally envisaged in the Strategic Defence
Review. British defense spending, at £38 billion in 2008, is now estimated to rep-
resent a mere 2.1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), its lowest rate since
the early 1930s and less than half of what it was in the late 1980s. Nevertheless,
the consensus view is that especially in the current recession, no significant up-
lift of this level seems in prospect. Although absolute cuts are unlikely in the near
term, defense inflation on its own could inflict real cuts of some 10 percent over
the next five years. For the medium to longer term, the government has inaugu-
rated a strategic-review process that could well add further real cuts to this. Ei-
ther way, the challenge will be to do more with less, very possibly much less.
T I L L 4 3
11
Till: Great Britain Gambles with the Royal Navy
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
As a result, the Royal Navy faces two distinct challenges. The first is how to get
through the next couple of almost certainly bleak years of severe constraint, and
the second will be how to respond to the resource implications of the expected
new strategic defense review of 2010–11, whatever they are.
The existence of a resources-commitments gap is not, of course, new, and in
the past a number of ways of bridging the divide have been tried, and these will
certainly be relevant for the next few years.
“Can Do.” “Working extra hard” is traditionally seen as the Royal Navy’s way of
getting through a difficult situation—in other words, a policy of expecting a
temporary level of performance from people and equipment well above what
was originally considered sustainable and then spinning that program out still
farther. The Royal Navy has always been most reluctant to refuse a commitment
even in circumstances that would make that seem reasonable, even sensible. The
most famous recent example of this occurred in 1982, when the First Sea Lord,
Sir Henry Leach, donned his uniform and demanded to see the prime minister,
the uncharacteristically uncertain Mrs. Thatcher, in order to assure her and the
country that the Royal Navy was able and willing to lead the campaign to retake
the Falkland Islands, despite every prospect of significant loss. As befits this “can
do” tradition the Royal Navy’s current operational tempo is extremely high,
some 40 percent of its force being committed to current operations.
But there are problems with this. Even when such operations are successful, as
they generally have been, the tempo inflicts personnel stresses, a higher rate of
equipment wear-out, reduced operational life for ships, weapons, and aircraft,
and, finally, skill fade in unexercised disciplines. For example, ships deployed as
singletons in order to maintain as much global coverage as possible may lose
some of the “edge” they need as constituents of a task force. More insidiously,
when the service so often delivers the apparently impossible (or at least the very
difficult), politicians, the public, and the Treasury come unreasonably to expect
that. Sympathetic critics argue that a few refusals might have a salutary effect,
leading to more resources or fewer commitments—the latter possibility, of
course, being the worry.
Combining with Partners. Responding to financially induced shortages
mandates working in coalitions of the willing. The Royal Navy argues that
high-intensity capabilities at sea confer status in alliances and greater influence
over events. The fact that, like the French, the British “do” nuclear deterrence,
carrier strike operations, and amphibiosity puts their influence and their gen-
eral contribution to alliances in a different category from those of the rest of the
Europeans (many of whom face similar problems). The British aspiration is not
just to participate in coalition operations but to lead them. Hence the EU’s
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counterpiracy campaign off Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, ATALANTA, is ef-
fectively run by the Royal Navy from NATO’s Allied Maritime Component
Command Headquarters at Northwood.
For the past century or so, the British have been well aware that “strategy” is as
much about influencing the behavior of allies as it is that of adversaries. For this
reason the Royal Navy puts considerable stress on the importance of maintain-
ing a credible global presence and of retaining a fleet sufficient in quality and
quantity to continue to command the levels of respect it has been used to in de-
cades past. The numerical decline in the fleet, however, makes that more diffi-
cult, because inevitably it reduces the Navy’s level of operational presence.
Joining with the Other Services. For years the British armed forces in general,
and the Royal Navy in particular, have consistently advocated the joint ap-
proach, for its now-obvious synergies of effort, resource, and effect.36 By offering
the opportunity to make the most of what each service can offer, close
interservice cooperation clearly means that more can be done with less. But as a
solution to the resources-commitments gap, British jointness is also revealing its
limits. First, the ferocious assaults apparently launched by both the Army and
the Royal Air Force on the carrier replacement program show that reducing re-
sources actually decreases the prospects for real jointness, certainly at the strate-
gic level, and so the latter is unlikely to be necessarily the solution to the former.
It may be, but often it won’t be. Second, there are areas in the spectrum of con-
flict that continue to require dedicated single-service specializations that cannot
safely be traded away in the name of jointness or economy. Third, the shortage of
resources leads to unsatisfactory risk-management compromises that in fact
satisfy the aspirations of none of the services, the Royal Navy included.
Seeking Other, CheaperWays of Doing Things. In return for a promise of a “core
work load” of naval production every year to help planning, the MOD expects
from industry significant improvements in efficiency, productivity, and profit-
ability. Much of this transformation in Britain’s shipbuilding capacity has been
driven by the requirement to tool up for the Queen Elizabeth–class aircraft car-
rier (CVF) and Future Surface Combatant (FSC) projects. As Lord Drayson, the
Defence Procurement Minister, stated in 2005, “The level of warship building
over the next 10 years is the largest the UK has seen for many years. . . . [W]e need
to find new ways to get the yards to work together, to pool resources and provide
investment so we have an industry which is more efficient and effective than it is
now. We have an opportunity to change ship-building in this country.”37
“Quite simply,” Archie Bethel, chief executive of Babcock Marine, has re-
marked, “we must continue to attack support costs, otherwise we will end up
with a smaller navy.”38 This followed Babcock’s acceptance of responsibility for
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operating a number of naval dockyards, bases, and depots, and it is an important
part of a determined campaign to transform, reduce, and simplify both the
Royal Navy’s support costs and its equipment-acquisition processes. Some of
these innovations have seemed radical. The Royal Navy’s hiring of the four
River-class ocean patrol vessels (HM Ships Tyne, Severn, and Mersey) for fishery
protection and HMS Clyde for the Falkland Islands Patrol from BVT Surface Fleet
(which still “owns” these ships) has proved a great success in cost-efficiency terms,
providing through a multiple-watch system completely predictable platform
availability for the MOD. Conversely, Vosper Thornycroft operates but does not
own the two survey vessels, HM Ships Echo and Enterprise, but is still con-
tracted to deliver 334 sea days a year. By these and a host of other reforms, the
Royal Navy now gets far more out of its ships than it used to. These days the
number of “operational” units generated by a given pool of ships is higher, and
modern technology often reduces operating costs too. A Type 45 destroyer, for
example, with its all-electric drive is expected to use half the fuel required for a
Type 23 frigate.
For the past fifty years a succession of major institutional reforms to the man-
ner in which ships, weapons, and sensors are designed and built—to correct for
past inefficiencies and partially compensate for ruthless defense inflation—have
been put in place, with varying success. A procurement system that delivers good
ships on budget and on time has long appeared to elude the Royal Navy. Partly
this has been a consequence of unsustainably optimistic projections of antici-
pated cost (no doubt in part intended to help secure political approval) and
partly because of the inherent problems of a maritime defense industry not suf-
ficiently tailored to suit modern conditions.39 The result in the 2004–2006 pe-
riod was something of a procurement crisis, resulting in cost and time overruns
that seriously threatened important shipbuilding projects.40
An official Defence Industrial Strategy that was finally issued in 2005 and a
Defence Technology Strategy in the following year have indicated a real determi-
nation to get to grips with this problem. It has led to a constructive rationaliza-
tion and consolidation of British defense industries, with, for example, a great
emphasis on teamwork among various providers, as demonstrated by the for-
mation of BVT and the Aircraft Carrier Alliance. This in turn promises to facili-
tate more cost-effective procedures, such as performance-based agreements,
and to help stabilize the maritime supply chain in the future. Progress in the re-
organization of the British defense industry and the development of the notion
of partnering between customer and supplier allowed the placing of major or-
ders in 2007.41
How effective these reforms will prove in the long run remains to be seen, al-
though initial prospects seem favorable.42 But a basic problem remains. The
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United Kingdom’s maritime defense industry is now, after a long period of fam-
ine, grappling with something like a feast in orders but suspects that in the lon-
ger term these orders could well drop off substantially. The industry is thus still
far from securing the steady and predictable flow of future orders that it would
like to have. For such reasons the instituted reforms have, for all their promise, so
far ameliorated rather than solved the real problem of a gap between commit-
ments and resources.
More Networking. An alternate way of making the most of fewer platforms is to
ensure that those few act together more coherently. Some have gone on to argue
that with network-enabling technologies there could be a shift in the composi-
tion of the fleet away from fewer large platforms to larger numbers of smaller
combatants gridded to operate together. The Royal Navy has not gone so far as to
accept the more radical of these views but nonetheless has put a good deal of ef-
fort into this non-platform-centric approach to the future fleet.43 In July 2004,
the “promise of a Co-operative Engagement capability (CEC) was used to justify
reducing destroyer and frigate numbers from 31 to 25.”44 Nonetheless, and de-
spite the service’s long experience in this field, the introduction and support of
these potentially transformational technologies are more likely to increase raw
costs for the Royal Navy than to reduce them. The full-blown CEC scheme
sketched out in July 2004 was in fact postponed for five years, in early 2005.
THE NEED FOR A MAJOR REVIEW
Given the failure of these palliatives to solve the United Kingdom’s long-standing
resources-commitments problem, there is a general recognition, across the po-
litical spectrum and among all the services, that in the current financial and stra-
tegic environment the country needs the kind of major rebalancing of
commitments and resources that only a rigorous strategic defense review can
provide. The last one of these was in 1997–98, with a “new chapter” added in
2002 in light of the focus on counterterrorism created by 9/11. The history of
British defense since 1945 shows something of a pattern of a review every decade
or so. Indeed, some believe Britain should adopt the more regular course correc-
tions provided by the American Quadrennial Defense Review process.
It was no surprise, then, that the government announced on 7 July 2009 a
wide-ranging consultative “green paper” (i.e., a preliminary government report
without commitment to action) on defense to be completed by the spring of
2010, when a new general election is widely expected. This will act as the founda-
tion for a full-blown strategic defense review through 2010–11 that will set the
agenda for the succeeding decade or so. The Conservative opposition has like-
wise announced its intention to follow much the same course, and a number of
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private organizations have already published significant contributions to the
debate.
Of these, perhaps the most comprehensive has been the Institute for Public
Policy Research’s very wide-ranging report Shared Responsibilities: A National
Security Strategy for the UK. Its emphasis is on defining security in the widest
way and on considering the defense dimension within that much broader con-
text. It also puts a good deal of stress on developing closer security relationships
with the rest of Europe in a much more unstable, multipolar world.45 Finding
what it calls “a black hole in the defence budget,” the IPPR report recommends a
close review of Britain’s projected defense-equipment requirements with a view
to “capability downgrading and quantity reductions, as well as for complete can-
cellation of some equipment programmes.”46 Significantly, the candidates of-
fered up for illustrative purposes were all naval: the Future Carrier program, the
Joint Strike Fighter, the Type 45 Daring-class destroyer, and the Astute-class sub-
marine. If it serves no other purpose, the report at least identifies some of the ar-
eas that the Royal Navy will need to defend in the coming round.47
The Strategic Deterrent
The Royal Navy has successfully operated Britain’s continuous-at-sea deterrent
for the past forty years and believes that none of its patrols have been detected,
even when one of its SSBNs (ballistic-missile submarines) was involved in a mi-
nor but extraordinary collision with a French SSBN in the Atlantic in February
2009!48 Each boat sails in “relaxed” mode, carrying forty-eight detargeted war-
heads that are on several days’ notice to fire. The Trident missile will not reach
the end of its operational life until around 2042, and the Vanguard submarines,
on current estimates, will require replacement in 2024.
The long lead time needed to build a new generation of ballistic missile–
firing submarines led the British government to outline plans in a December
2006 white paper and then in May 2007 to authorize design and concept work
for a new class of submarines. The new submarines are expected to have twelve
rather than the current sixteen missile tubes, and a British-led contract has been
awarded to General Dynamics Electric Boat to design a “Common Missile
Compartment” for both the United Kingdom’s successor submarines and the
U.S. Navy’s projected Ohio-replacement SSBNs.49 This followed a year of inten-
sive review by the Ministry of Defence of over a hundred alternative ways of
maintaining a deterrent. The conclusion of the review was that only a Tri-
dent-like system would produce the necessary capabilities at bearable cost. The
highly classified nature of much of the evidence considered in this review greatly
limited its visibility and contributed to quite a widespread perception that the
decision was more of an instinctive reflex than the result of a rigorous analysis of
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all the issues.50 Also, although spread over many years, the program, at an esti-
mated £24 billion, seems to many extremely expensive at a time of major con-
straint. Accordingly, many have argued that the decision ought to be put back on
the table for a second look, given that contracts for the build of the new subma-
rines may not need to be placed until perhaps 2014.51
So far, though, the government has, uniquely, excluded the possibility of a re-
consideration of this program from the green-paper process. The National Se-
curity Strategy was quite clear that “a minimum strategic deterrent capability is
likely to remain a necessary element of our national security for the foreseeable
future.”52 Even the rather more skeptical IPPR report has concluded that devel-
opment work should continue and that consideration be given to “a further
run-on, beyond 2024 of the existing Vanguard hulls,” since “a minimum UK de-
terrent is still needed.”53 The Conservative opposition has in theory acknowl-
edged the necessity of a degree of reconsideration;54 nonetheless, it is still likely
to accept the need for a submarine-based system of some sort, although there is
an appetite within the party for much cheaper solutions. There remains, fur-
thermore, the wider skepticism about whether the United Kingdom needs an in-
dependent nuclear deterrent at all. The prime minster’s recent decision to delay
Trident design work and his apparent readiness to consider such various “Tri-
dent Lite” alternatives as three rather than four SSBNs and a reduced number of
warheads may prove significant.55
The Astute-Class Submarines
The 7,400-ton Astute SSN, the first of which is expected to be delivered by the
end of 2009 (at the time of writing), is closely related to this issue. Three others
have been laid down and long-lead orders given for two more; an order for the
seventh boat, to be delivered around 2020, should be issued next year. An eighth
boat seems problematic.56 This constitutes a significant drop in SSN numbers
since 1998 from fourteen to perhaps eight. Originally scheduled to produce the
first Astute in June 2005, the program has been subject to delays, cost increases,
and constructional problems that are partly attributable to a certain fading in
skills as a result of the long gap since the early 1990s, the construction of the last
Vanguard. The delays and difficulties are also due to the determination to give
this submarine some extraordinary, world-class capabilities. Finally, the Astute
program exemplifies one of the most difficult problems facing the British mari-
time defense industry—the fact that the SSN building industry is highly special-
ist, with only one supplier (once Babcocks, now BAE Systems at Barrow), one
customer, and no prospect for export. As a result, the program has also to sup-
port the costs of retaining the industry.
T I L L 4 9
17
Till: Great Britain Gambles with the Royal Navy
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the program was in real trouble in the 2002–2005 pe-
riod, but it has now, with the negotiation of new agreements and procedures be-
tween the MOD and BAE Systems, been successfully turned around. As Murray
Easton, managing director of the project at Barrow, remarked, “We were in a
marginal situation with Astute and just survived. If we were to go through any-
thing like that again, then we almost definitely wouldn’t recover.”57
For this reason, going instead for a regular, plannable, and predictable drum-
beat of nuclear submarine construction would have many advantages for indus-
try. The Defence Industrial Strategy agreement of 2005 sought to solve this
problem for BAE Systems at Barrow with a long-term agreement to deliver one
submarine every twenty-two months. After the Future Attack Submarine proj-
ect, which was intended to be a follow-on to the Astute class, was quietly termi-
nated in 2001, the future of the SSN building industry seems linked to the
Trident replacement project. Were it decided not to build successors to the Van-
guard SSBN, the likely atrophying of submarine design and construction skills
would make a longer-term replacement for the Astutes highly problematic.58
The Type 45 Daring-Class Destroyer Program
The Daring Type 45 destroyer was another extremely complex and ambitious
program, one that pulled together the productive efforts of over seven thousand
defense firms. Adam Ingram, Minister for the Armed Forces, stated in 2003 that
the principal role of the Type 45 Destroyers will be antiair warfare. However, these
ships are being built with significant space and weight margins to enable incremental
acquisition should an emerging requirement necessitate a different equipment fit.
Our requirements are being kept under review, and the design could be modified to
incorporate improved land attack capabilities, including a cruise missile system such
as Tomahawk.59
Perhaps inevitably, its costs increased over budget, and six ships rather than
the twelve originally envisaged were decided upon—contributing, of course, to
each ship’s being significantly more expensive than originally planned for.
About three years late, this program is now nearing completion, and the Royal
Navy claims with some justification that the result has indeed been what is, in
many respects, a world-beating AAW destroyer. With its Samson radar, a single
Daring will be able to monitor all takeoffs and landings from every major airport
within two hundred miles of Portsmouth, including London Heathrow and
Gatwick. Able to engage twelve air targets simultaneously, a Type 45 could single-
handedly protect London from air attack.60 The design, moreover, is spacious,
with all the growth potential anticipated by Adam Ingram in 2003.
Nonetheless, criticisms of the project have been made. Its Sea Viper principal
antiair missile system has not yet been fired from the ship, although extensive
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trials (including a first sea-firing on 4 February 2009) have taken place. A
cross-party committee of members of Parliament has been critical of the MOD’s
project management for its alleged deficiencies.61 Another criticism has fastened
onto the fact that the Daring has not been fitted with land-attack missiles, as a
result, some say, of a blocking operation carried out by a Royal Air Force con-
cerned about the survival of its deep-strike role.62 The vessel’s highly sophisti-
cated Samson radar system would allow it to grow into a highly effective ballistic
missile–defense role; given the proliferation of missiles around the world, this
seems a likely requirement.
The Carrier Program
The program for two sixty-five-thousand-ton CVFs originally announced in the
1998 Strategic Defence Review has now been confirmed, much subcontracted
work has already been completed, and the first steel was cut ceremonially on 7
July 2009, but these ships remain controversial. The British press has reported
widespread opposition to them within Army and Royal Air Force circles and it-
self has exhibited skepticism about whether they really constitute good value for
money. The IPPR report also identified the carrier and the associated JSF pro-
grams (138 aircraft for the Royal Navy and for the RAF, at an estimated five and
ten billion pounds, respectively) as major sources of significant future savings
on the defense budget.
The in-service dates of the two carriers were originally 2012 for Queen Eliza-
beth and 2015 for Prince of Wales. The decision in December 2008 to delay the
completion of the two carriers by approximately two years, in order to
“reprioritise investment to meet current operational priorities and to better
align the programme with the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft,” added at least £600
million to the £3.9 billion already envisaged.63 Now HMS Queen Elizabeth is due
for completion in 2016 and Prince of Wales two years later in 2018. Each will be
able to take from thirty-five to forty fighter aircraft and a large number of heli-
copters and UAVs.
The arguments against the completion of the project are fairly familiar.64
Given their high-seeming cost and the likely presence of allied carriers and
friendly land bases, some believe that the need for such an ambitious capability
is overstated. The IPPR report makes the point that since Britain is likely to en-
gage in major combat operations only in coalitions led, most likely, by the
United States, investment in capabilities already held “in abundance, relative to
any adversary,” seems unwise.65
The worst aspect of this controversy has been the reappearance of destructive
interservice tribalism. The British Army’s position is that current expenditure
for the forces actively engaged in Afghanistan should take priority for the next
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ten years or so, rather than weapons systems, “relics of the Cold War,” which it
claims are primarily intended for high-intensity interstate warfare. The RAF has
attacked the carriers more insidiously, first arguing that the Harrier force on the
Royal Navy’s existing carriers should be scrapped, thereby opening up a serious
gap until the putative arrival of the JSFs. Beaten off in this attack, the RAF then
argued that it should take over entire responsibility for naval aviation, promis-
ing to make nonspecialist aircrew available as and when necessary. This threat to
return to the dreadful days of “Dual Control” in the interwar period has likewise
been defeated, at least for the time being.66
The carrier program’s heavy reliance on the prompt arrival of the verti-
cal/short-takeoff-and-landing (V/STOL) version of the JSF F-35B as the answer
to the RAF/Royal Navy requirement for perhaps 138 Joint Combat Aircraft re-
mains a source of danger, and any significant delay could hugely complicate the
carrier project.67 The V/STOL ramp could be removed and replaced by conven-
tional catapults, but this would cost considerable money and time. The fact that
the United Kingdom has invested enough in this project to become a Level 1
partner (that is, to have a significant role in the project’s direction) with the
United States indicates in itself, however, the priority currently attached to it.
The CVF’s defenders point to the manifest utility of the carrier in most
war-fighting, expeditionary, and conflict-prevention situations. Britain’s capac-
ity “to deliver airpower from the sea wherever and whenever it is required” until
about 2070 will facilitate “strategic effect, influence and, where necessary, direct
action [that] will give us an unprecedented range of options to deal with the
challenges of an uncertain world at a time and place of our choosing.”68 The
Navy has argued that the experience of the past fifty years amply demonstrates
the advantages of sea-based aviation in a manner likely to be confirmed in the
next fifty.69 The CVF and its air group could be flexibly tailored to cope with ac-
tivities in all of the four main task areas identified earlier.
Moreover, given the inability to run the elderly Invincible carriers and Harrier
fleet still further and the absence of a “Plan B,” the loss of this program would
put the Royal Navy at a major disadvantage relative to all the world’s other car-
rier navies (including several European ones)—a position from which it would
be very difficult indeed to recover. Given the increasing domestic and interna-
tional challenges facing the U.S. Navy’s carrier program in the next few decades
and the rising naval powers of the Asia-Pacific, the loss of these two “medium”
carriers would materially change the global naval balance for “the West.”
With Quentin Davies, the Minister for Defence Equipment and Support, an-
nouncing at the steel cutting that aircraft carriers “are a corner-stone of British
Defence,” the naval view seems to have prevailed for the moment, but few doubt
that the way ahead will be rocky. The industrial side of the argument, often
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overlooked, may prove decisive. The carrier project employs ten thousand ship-
yard workers directly (mainly in Glasgow and Rosyth, in politically sensitive
Scotland) and an estimated forty to fifty thousand more workers among the
many subcontractors spread around the rest of Britain and, indeed, abroad. The
Aircraft Carrier Alliance, largely comprising a functional merger of BAE Sys-
tems and Vosper Thornycroft, the two largest shipbuilding concerns in the
country, is, as we have seen, represented as an imaginative rationalization in sup-
port of the government’s Defence Industrial Strategy of keeping world-class de-
fense technologies in Britain.70
Although the completion date of the carriers has been put back two years, the
project has advanced since the contract was signed on 3 July 2008 more than is
generally recognized. Work has gone ahead on the generators in France and Italy,
on the shaft lines in the Czech Republic, on the rudders and propeller blades, on
the aircraft lifts, the automatic weapons-handling system, bridge and antennae
design, and so on, alongside heavy investment in infrastructure, especially in the
No. 1 Dock at Rosyth. Numerous suballiance contracts have been signed—for
example, to de-risk interface problems between the carriers and its aircraft and
to deliver the propulsion systems needed to drive what will be the world’s biggest
all-electric ships.71 Given such sunk costs, cancelling the project at this stage
would be very expensive in financial terms. For the time being, at any rate, the
National Security Strategy emphasizes “continued commitment to renewing the
Royal Navy, through Type 45 destroyers, Astute submarines and the Future Air-
craft Carriers.”72
All the same, the new First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, has admit-
ted that the carrier program could be overturned. In the meantime, industry is
forging ahead, and with the return of the British Harrier force from its diversion
to Afghanistan, the necessary work on regenerating carrier-strike capability on
HMS Invincible and then Ark Royal has now resumed. Exercise AURIGA, the
group deployment for 2010, will be important from this point of view.73
The MARS Program
The Military Afloat Reach Sustainability (MARS) program attracts much less at-
tention than the Royal Navy’s other, higher-profile projects, but it is critical to
the support of the service’s sustained global presence, to the development of
British concepts of sea basing, and to the logistic support of British joint forces
ashore.74 The Royal Navy’s current tankers and solid-support ships are ageing
fast, find it difficult to keep up with modern task groups, and include single-
hulled tankers of dubious legality. Originally the program was intended to pro-
duce a total of eleven new ships between 2011 and 2021 at a cost of some £2.5
billion, but delays have been experienced, partly because of the program’s
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concurrency with the CVF, Type 45, and Astute projects. Two Wave-class auxil-
iary oil tankers have been delivered, but the overall series is worryingly late.
The Future Surface Combatant
The “hi/lo mix” issue (that is, the idea of combining sophisticated but expensive
units with forces less capable but affordable in greater numbers) is exactly illus-
trated by the current debate over the Future Surface Combatant. This program,
intended to replace the Type 22s, 23s, and lesser types as well, started in the
mid-1990s but failed in 1999 and had to be resurrected in 2003.75 The cancella-
tion of the last two Type 45s (numbers 7 and 8, known colloquially as HM Ships
Dubious and Doubtful) in the original plan provided headroom for the resusci-
tation and indeed partial acceleration of this project, but the accumulated delay
makes an eventual shortfall in destroyer and frigate numbers almost inevitable.
The precise mix of ships to be adopted has always been a very complex matter,
but since these ships are to be the mainstay of the Royal Navy for decades, it was,
and indeed remains, clearly important to get the project right.
Some argue that this family of ships should include a sizable investment in
new, less capable, and cheaper—if not “cheap as chips”—warships, more modu-
lar and fitted for, but not with, specialist equipment. This thinking reflects a con-
cern that the reduction in numbers brought about by an insistence on high
quality in warship design dangerously reduces the geographic coverage that the
fleet provides. However good it is, a warship can only be in one place at one time.
Having secured just six of the Daring class, these people think, there is now a
need for a bigger focus on simple numbers.
A second school of thought is somewhat less concerned about the drop in
numbers, having greater faith in the compensating effect of high quality. With
technical advances and the astonishing speed at which first-line warships can
move, the coverage afforded by a modern warship amply compensates for a drop
in numbers, its adherents say. Pointing to the deeply impressive capabilities of
the Type 45, they conclude, “Measuring the capability of our Armed Forces by
the number of units or platforms in their possession will no longer be signifi-
cant.”76 For such reasons, this school continues to uphold the traditional Royal
Navy policy of placing its major investments in capable, high-end war-fighting
platforms. They also maintain that governments would be less willing to use the
second-rate ships of a two-tier navy in any but the most benign of environ-
ments, when, in fact, support ships might offer greater capability.
At the moment, there is a broad balancing consensus that the FSC family
should comprise three classes of ship:
• C1: large, capable warships intended for ASW and land attack, with organic
mine countermeasures (MCM) and a limited capacity to carry a military
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force. The C1 should be big, with a large flight deck and growth potential.
It would be able to join a deployed task group. The aspiration is for the first
of these to be commissioned in 2017, an ambitious target indeed.
• C2: smaller, less sophisticated, and so cheaper general-purpose vessels, pos-
sibly with the same hull as the C1, intended for lower-scale stabilization
and maritime security operations.
• C3: a diverse family of significantly smaller ships capable of operating on
the open ocean and of being configured for a variety of roles, including off-
shore patrol, MCM, hydrography, and oceanography. These ships, in effect,
are now regarded as a distinctive group in their own right, but alongside
the C2s they could provide presence and often be entrusted with conflict-
prevention and maritime security operations around the world.77
The notion that we will see a blurring of the differences between simpler frig-
ates and minor war vessels and a trend toward more multipurpose vessels mak-
ing use of modular and unmanned technologies is part of this debate. The
thinking behind the C2 variant is particularly revolutionary, since it approaches
the controversial notion of building a major warship that from the war-fighting
point of view would be second-class by design. Admiral Sir Jonathon Band was
“much more interested in something which is designed first and foremost to
perform maritime patrol and presence tasks, with the ability to contribute to
‘classic’ warfare tasks if required.”78
By such innovative thinking the planners hope to be able to help solve the
numbers problem; to reduce the current diversity in platforms, weapons, and
sensors; and to do both at sustainable cost. Early progress in this project is also
seen as essential as a means of providing the British warship-building industry
with a sustained basis for sensible planning. For the same reason it is important
that some of the variants have export potential. Thinking about all of this, espe-
cially the C3 variant, is quite tentative at the moment, however, and no quick or
easy solution to the Royal Navy’s numbers problem is expected. In the mean-
time, plans exist to upgrade and run on some of the Type 22 and Type 23 frigates
as a way to keep frigate numbers up until the 2030s.79 Some of these hulls are
likely to remain in service for between thirty-two and thirty-six years—nearly
twice as long as originally envisaged. The FSC program attracts nothing like the
public attention given to the carriers and Trident, but it is hard to exaggerate its
importance for the Royal Navy as an oceangoing force in the longer term.
AIMING FOR THE VERY BEST
The conclusion that emerges is that for all its apparent reductions in size, the re-
ported death of the Royal Navy has as yet been considerably exaggerated. Instead
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what the world may be watching is a major process of transformation, and in some
ways rebirth, of what is still and will remain one of the world’s significant navies.
A succession of British defense policy makers over the past ten or fifteen years
have collectively taken, under extreme financial and operational pressure, a real
and potentially risky gamble for their navy’s future. They have decided that the
Royal Navy must stay in the front line—the premier division, in soccer
terms—and to that end they have set going the most ambitious program of fleet
recapitalization for perhaps forty years, at a time when naval defense spending is
less than half of what it was in the Cold War era. The price deliberately and con-
sciously paid for this ambitious renewal has already been severe in numbers of
ships, submarines, aircraft, and people. But insofar as the tonnage of frontline
ships is concerned, today’s built and building fleet is appreciably larger than it
was in 1997, even without the Future Surface Combatant. The final rewards of
this Nelsonian policy of aiming for the very best will be apparent only when the
major programs described above complete or start to come through.
The problem for the Royal Navy is that the general situation has greatly wors-
ened since this long campaign began. The so-called War on Terror has produced
two conflicts in which the United Kingdom has found itself in savage and expen-
sive land-based wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, whose needs command the atten-
tion of governments, politicians, and the media. The facts that over half the air
strikes in Afghanistan are from carriers and that 40 percent of the British person-
nel engaged in that unrelenting campaign have at various times been naval
(counting the Royal Marines as such) make no difference. At a time when journal-
ism, the defense variant included, can be likened to the “industrialization of gos-
sip,” the facts are less important than the narrative—it is the impression that
counts. And the impression is that the Army is doing all the fighting and so de-
serves the resources. Given the very short political horizon of most politicians and
media folk, this is potentially a very dangerous development for the Royal Navy.80
However, a growing public distaste for engagement in large-scale, open-ended
conflicts on, and garrisoning of, parts of the Asian mainland (or anywhere else,
for that matter) will probably militate against the assumption that the strategic
future should be merely the strategic present extrapolated forward. Accordingly,
one of the most contentious and critical issues in the Strategic Defence Review
will therefore be the extent to which current experience should act as a template
for defense preparation in the medium and longer terms. It may well be that the
review will herald a marked shift away from fighting future Afghanistans and
back toward the traditional, more modest, maritime conceptions of strategy that
have served Britain rather well over the past three hundred years.
The new review will certainly need to address the extraordinary disconnect
that has developed over the years between a growing awareness of Britain’s
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dependence on the sea for its safety and security, on the one hand (as exempli-
fied by the government’s rejuvenation of the British shipping industry, the at-
tention paid to maritime security in the National Security Strategy, and today’s
very high levels of directed naval engagement), and, on the other, a continued
shortfall in the allocation of resources needed to sustain it.
On top of all that come the effects of the worst economic recession for the
United Kingdom in three-quarters of a century. The United Kingdom’s national
debt is now some 12 percent of GDP, and government revenues are some £175
billion overdrawn. Accordingly, significant reductions in medium-term govern-
ment spending can be anticipated, not least in defense. Although both major po-
litical parties have suggested that they will seek to protect the defense budget,
estimates of the size of prospective defense cuts vary widely; the newspapers talk
of 10, 15, even 30 percent reductions. At the moment no one knows, nor will
they until the new Strategic Defence Review is completed. Nor do we know
which government will make the next round of decisions in 2010. The political
certainties are few. If past history and current political attitudes to national
spending and borrowing are anything to go by, we can expect a Conservative
government under David Cameron to be significantly less sympathetic to the
Royal Navy than the current administration. All in all, it would be wildly opti-
mistic to imagine the Royal Navy’s emerging completely unscathed from this
deadly barrage of unexpected and unpredictable fire.
All this may make the chances that this, Great Britain’s greatest gamble with
its navy, will actually come off seem quite remote, but the successfully completed
transformation of the United Kingdom’s amphibious capability (once long de-
spaired of) and the appearance of the Darings and the Astutes may suggest, for
all the contention, that as so often before the Royal Navy will prevail against the
odds. Certainly, for the long-term prosperity and security of the country and for
the rules-based maritime order of which it is a part, one must hope so.
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